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Abstract 
 
 The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) has set legally binding emissions targets for a basket of six greenhouse 
gases and timetables for industrialised countries. It has also incorporated three 
international flexibility mechanisms. However, the Articles defining the flexibility 
mechanisms carry wording that their use must be supplemental to domestic actions.  This 
has led to the open debates on interpretations of these supplementarity provisions. Such 
debates ended at the resumed sixth Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC, 
held in Bonn, July 2001, and at the subsequent COP-7 in Marrakesh, November 2001. 
The final wording in the Bonn Agreement, reaffirmed in the Marrakesh Accords, at least 
indicates that domestic policies will have an important role to play in meeting Annex B 
countries’ emissions commitments. Carbon taxes have long been advocated because of 
their cost-effectiveness in achieving a given emissions reduction. In this paper, the main 
economic impacts of carbon taxes are assessed. Based on a review of empirical studies on 
existing carbon/energy taxes, it is concluded that competitive losses and distributive 
impacts are generally not significant and definitely less than often perceived. However, 
given the ultimate objective of the Framework Convention, future carbon taxes could 
have higher rates than those already imposed and thus the resulting economic impacts 
could be more acute. In this context, it has been shown that how to use the generated 
fiscal revenues will be of fundamental importance in determining the final economic 
impacts of carbon taxes. Finally, we briefly discuss carbon taxes in combination with 
other domestic and international instruments.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) has set legally binding reduction targets for greenhouse gases 
emissions to countries listed in its Annex B and introduced three international flexibility 
mechanisms, namely, international emissions trading, joint implementation, and the clean 
development mechanism (CDM).1 However, the Articles defining the flexibility 
mechanisms carry wording that their use must be supplemental to domestic actions. This 
is the so-called supplementarity provision. The European Union (EU) put forward a 
proposal for quantitative ceilings on the use of flexibility mechanisms (European Union, 
1999), insisting that domestic abatement actions should be the main means of meeting 
emissions reductions required of each Annex B country (in other words, at least half of 
                                                          
1 Annex B countries are the OECD countries and countries in transition to a market 
economy. The Kyoto Protocol includes six greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide (CO2), 
methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), 
and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). The Protocol will become effective once it is ratified by 
no less than 55% of the countries to the Convention whose CO2 emissions represent at least 
55% of the total from Annex I countries in the year 1990. 
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the emissions reductions required have to be undertaken domestically).2 With the US 
withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in March 2001, the EU dropped its previous 
insistence on a cap on the use of flexibility mechanisms to secure the reluctant support of 
other Umbrella Group3 members for the Protocol at the resumed sixth Conference of the 
Parties to the UNFCCC, held in Bonn, July 2001. The final wording in the Bonn 
Agreement, reaffirmed in the Marrakesh Accords, is now that “domestic action shall thus 
constitute a significant element of the effort made by each Party included in Annex I to 
meet its quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments”. This at least 
indicates that domestic policies will have an important role to play in meeting Annex B 
countries’ emissions commitments. 
Article 2 of the Kyoto Protocol gives Annex B countries considerable flexibility 
in the choice of domestic policies to meet their emissions commitments. Possible policies 
include carbon/energy taxes, domestic emissions trading, command-and-control 
regulations and other policies. Economists and international organisations have long 
advocated carbon taxes, because they can achieve the same emissions reduction target at 
lower costs than conventional command-and-control regulations. Moreover, carbon taxes 
can act as a continuous incentive to search for cleaner technologies, while for command-
and-control regulations there is no incentive for the polluters to go beyond the standards, 
                                                          
2 See Zhang (2000, 2001) for detailed discussion on these supplementarity provisions and 
on the assessment of the EU proposal for ceilings on the use of Kyoto flexibility 
mechanisms. 
3 The Umbrella Group refers to the so-called JUSSCANNZ countries (Japan, the United 
States, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway, New Zealand). It meets daily during the 
international climate change negotiations to exchange information and discuss 
substance/strategy on issues where there is common ground. 
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unless the standards are continually revised and set slightly above the best available 
technologies (Zhang, 1997). In actual practice, only few European countries have already 
implemented taxes based in part on the carbon content of the energy products. 
 This paper assesses the empirical evidence of the main economic impacts of 
carbon taxes. Section 2 briefly compares carbon taxes with energy taxes. Section 3 
discusses the treatment of carbon tax revenues. Sections 4 and 5 provide an assessment of 
the implications of carbon taxes for distribution of income and for international 
competitiveness, respectively. The paper ends with some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Energy taxes versus carbon taxes 
 
 An energy tax is an excise tax, which is defined as a fixed absolute amount of, for 
example, US$ per Terajoule, per British thermal units, or per kilowatt-hour. An energy tax 
is imposed on both fossil fuels and carbon free energy sources, according to their energy 
(or heat) contents, with renewables usually being exempted. By contrast, a carbon tax is an 
excise tax imposed according to the carbon content of fossil fuels and is thus restricted to 
carbon-based fuels only.4 Given that oil and gas have greater heat contents for a given 
amount of CO2 emissions as compared with coal, an energy tax lies more heavily on oil and 
gas than a carbon tax. Moreover, an energy tax burdens nuclear energy, which could 
provide large-scale generation of electricity without a directly parallel production of CO2 
emissions. 
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 If the goal is to reduce CO2 emissions, a carbon tax is more cost-effective than an 
energy tax. Indeed, a carbon tax equalises the marginal cost of CO2 abatement across fuels 
and therefore satisfies the condition for minimising the global cost of reducing CO2 
emissions. Therefore, the implementation of an energy tax will lead to poor CO2 target 
achievement or else to unnecessarily high costs as compared with a carbon tax (cf. 
Kågeson, 1991; Cline, 1992; Jorgenson and Wilcoxen, 1993b). This can be explained by 
two factors: price-induced energy conservation and fuel switching (Manne and Richels, 
1993). Carbon taxes reduce CO2 emissions through both their price mechanism effects on 
energy consumption and fuel choice. By contrast, since the energy tax is imposed on fossil 
fuels and nuclear energy, the incentive for fuel switching is lower and the reductions in 
CO2 emissions will be mainly achieved by price-induced energy conservation.5 Thus, a 
higher energy tax is required for achieving the same reduction target as compared with a 
carbon tax. In other words, it is more costly to reduce CO2 emissions through an energy tax 
than through a carbon tax. This has clearly been shown by the study of Manne and Richels 
(1993), which evaluates the implications of the Commission of the European 
Communities’ (CEC) proposal for a mixed carbon and energy tax.6 Similar findings are 
                                                                                                                                                                             
4 A carbon tax can be translated into a CO2 tax , since a ton of carbon corresponds to 3.67 
tons of CO2. 
5 Of course, in environmental terms there could be good reasons for also discouraging the 
use of nuclear energy. In this case, contrary to a carbon tax, an energy tax will give a 
greater incentive to switch to renewable energy.   
6 Recognising that a carbon tax puts a relatively high pressure on coal, the most secure 
energy supply, and that both a carbon tax and an energy tax have a quite different impact 
on member states, a carbon/energy tax was proposed by the CEC as part of its comprehen-
sive strategy to control CO2 emissions and increase energy efficiency. The CEC proposal 
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also found in other studies by Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993b) and Beauséjour et al. 
(1995). The results of Jorgenson and Wilcoxen suggest that, in 2020, the US GNP loss 
from an energy tax will be 20% greater than that resulting from a carbon tax in order to 
stabilise the US CO2 emissions at 1990 levels in that year. The results of Beauséjour et al. 
indicate that, in 2000, Canada's GDP loss from an energy tax will be 20% greater than that 
resulting from a carbon tax in order to stabilise Canada's CO2 emissions at 1990 levels in 
that year. While being more cost-effective, the carbon tax is also less burdensome, since it 
raises a smaller amount of government revenues for a given reduction of CO2 emissions 
(Jorgenson and Wilcoxen, 1993b; Beauséjour et al., 1995). 
 Let us now focus in some detail on the carbon tax. So far, a number of studies have 
focused on the cost estimates for achieving a given reduction in CO2 emissions. These 
studies usually incorporate a carbon tax as an instrument to achieve the target because of its 
cost-effectiveness. The main findings arising from these studies are that, among other 
things: 
 
• The carbon tax rate should increase over time if it has to reflect the rising costs of 
damages from the accumulation of CO2 concentration in the atmosphere; if it has to 
give the markets the signal that CO2 emissions will eventually be heavily taxed; and 
if there are few economically feasible substitutes available. This signal strengthens 
                                                                                                                                                                             
was that member states introduce a carbon/energy tax of US$ 3 per barrel oil equivalent in 
1993, rising in real terms by US$ 1 a year to US$ 10 per barrel in 2000. After the year 
2000, the tax rate will remain at US$ 10 per barrel at 1993 prices. The tax rates are alloc-
ated across fuels, with 50% based on carbon content and 50% on energy content (cf. CEC, 
1991). 
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the incentive for technical innovation needed to make more stringent future 
emissions targets affordable;7 
• There would be significant variation in timing and size of the carbon taxes among 
countries and regions, given that the marginal cost of abating CO2 emissions 
substantially differs across countries and over time; 
• The autonomous (that is, non-price-induced) energy efficiency improvement, the 
possibilities for fuel substitution, and the availability of backstop technologies are 
essential elements in determining the evolution of the tax rate over time. Without 
non-fossil fuel options, the upper bound on the required carbon tax rate would rise. 
The autonomous energy efficiency improvement and the cost and availability of low-
carbon or carbon-free backstop technologies are crucial to limit the tax rate required 
and thus reducing the costs incurred for compliance with emission reduction targets; 
8 
• The carbon tax could be production- or consumption-based, but the effects across 
options would be significantly different among countries. A national production-
based carbon tax operates much like an export tax. If applied, oil-exporting countries 
such as OPEC would gain substantially, because the revenues generated from such a 
production tax accrue to countries proportional to their own production. On the 
                                                          
 In addition, in the presence 7 of inflation, the tax rate has to be indexed to keep the price 
8
signal constant in real terms.  
 As assumed in the GREEN model, the backstop technologies are produced at a constant 
marginal cost, without any constraint on supply (cf. Burniaux et al., 1992). Thus, the 
carbon tax rate needs not to increase further than that level. If there are few economically 
feasible substitutes available, however, the effectiveness of a carbon tax is likely to be 
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contrary, a national consumption-based tax acts somewhat like an import tariff. In 
that case, oil-exporting countries would suffer considerably, because the revenues 
generated from such a consumption tax accrue to countries proportional to their 
consumption (Whalley, 1991; Whalley and Wigle, 1991a, 1991b);  
• Carbon taxes imposed unilaterally or even regionally would be largely ineffective (cf. 
Pezzey, 1992; Felder and Rutherford, 1993). This ineffectiveness is attributed partly 
to the relatively small share of the coalition (for example, EU, OECD) emissions in 
the world total, and partly to the strong economic growth and the resulting increase in 
emissions taking place in non-coalition countries that offset the coalition’s 
achievements;9 and 
• The carbon tax itself would impose a deadweight loss on a country where there are 
no distortions in the energy markets. However, when existing distortions arising from 
energy subsidies are taken into account or when the revenues generated from the 
imposition of a carbon tax are recycled to the economy for reducing a distortionary 
tax, the introduction of a carbon tax could even lead to a net gain.10 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
much more limited. Thus, to lower CO2 emissions very substantially would require a high 
carbon tax - certainly higher than the taxes already imposed (Barrett, 1991). 
9 This is the so-called ‘carbon leakage’ phenomenon, with its average leakage rate being 
defined as the ratio of carbon emission increase outside the coalition to carbon emission 
cutbacks within the coalition relative to their reference levels (cf. Felder and Rutherford, 
1993). 
10 For example, the results based on the GREEN model clearly indicate the net gains for 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union if the existing energy subsidies are taken into 
account. See also in the next section the discussion on the ‘double dividend’ issue. 
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 The remainder of the paper will not go into these interesting topics any further, but 
instead will focus on three aspects that are considered important when designing a domestic 
arbon tax, namely, (i) the treatment of the carbon tax revenues, (ii) the impacts on the 
istribution of income, and (iii) the effects on international competitiveness. 
ment revenues (Lee and 
                                                          
c
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3. The treatment of the carbon tax revenues 
 
 Let us begin with the treatment of the carbon tax revenues. It has been argued that 
there is a ‘double dividend’ from the carbon tax (Pearce, 1991): not only an environmental 
dividend through reduced emissions of pollutants (i.e., a reduction in CO2 and other 
pollutants associated with fossil fuels combustion), but also an additional dividend in terms 
of a reduction in the overall economic cost of raising govern
Misiolek, 1986; Feldstein, 1999).11 In the literature, the weak ‘double dividend’ and the 
strong ‘double dividend’ are distinguished (see Goulder, 1995). 
  The weak ‘double dividend’ proposition states that, in welfare terms, the non-
environmental dividend is always positive, as a reduction in distortionary taxes is always 
superior to a reduction of lump-sum taxes. In other words, costs savings may be achieved 
11 The non-environmental dividend is very often interpreted as using the extra carbon tax 
revenues to reduce existing distortionary taxes for raising government revenues. This 
dividend can of course have other interpretations. In the study of Bovenberg (1994), for 
instance, reduced unemployment is referred to as the potential extra dividend in addition to 
improved environmental quality. In the context of tradeable carbon permits, the extra 
dividend refers to the proceeds from the sale of carbon emission permits (Manne and 
Richels, 1995). 
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by using carbon taxes revenues to reduce distortionary taxes, with respect to the case where 
tax revenues are returned in a lump-sum way. The magnitude of the potential cost savings 
depends on each country’s particular economic circumstances. For instance, in the US 
economy, as indicated in Bovenberg and Goulder (1996), capital is overtaxed with respect 
to labour. In this case, using carbon taxes revenues to correct taxation towards lower taxes 
on capital may produce higher cost savings than reducing labour taxes. 
  The strong ‘double dividend’ proposition states that the non-environmental 
dividend is larger than the gross costs. In this case, it would mean that ‘green tax swaps’ 
could be costless to introduce, because they yield a net welfare gain (or a higher GDP or 
employment). In the literature, there are, however, ambiguities as to whether the strong 
economic double dividend hypothesis can be accepted or has to be rejected. On the one 
hand, results from some empirical studies (cf. Ekins 1998, EC 1997, Barker 1995, Bach et 
al., 1994) show that an improvement in the environmental quality can be accompanied by a 
simultaneous increase in employment. On the other hand, other studies seem to reject the 
hypothesis (e.g., Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996), at least when the initial tax system is 
relatively efficient. Such results are pointed out when considering the interaction of carbon 
taxes with the existing tax system. Indeed, the existence of an economic double dividend 
depends on two effects (see Parry, 1997). First, since carbon taxes add to existing 
distortionary taxes (e.g., on labour and capital), they may further reduce overall 
employment and investment. This is what is called the ‘tax-interaction’ effect, which raises 
the costs of reducing carbon emissions. Second, carbon taxes revenues may be used to 
reduce the level of distortionary taxes, thus producing an economic gain (called the 
‘revenue-recycling’ effect). The overall cost of carbon taxes depends on the relative weight 
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of the previous two effects and is thus mainly an empirical issue. If the welfare gain from 
the revenue-recycling effect is higher than the welfare costs from the tax-interaction effect, 
higher economic costs in the former case 
                                                          
then there is an economic net benefit (i.e., a strong economic ‘double dividend’) from 
carbon taxes. 
 It should however be emphasised that, by accounting for pre-existing 
distortionary taxes, revenue-raising instruments result in even higher costs savings, with 
respect to command-and-control (or freely distributed  permits) approach. For instance, 
Parry, Williams and Goulder (1999) have showed that the costs of reducing U.S. CO2 
emissions by 10% in a second-best setting with pre-existing labour taxes are five times 
higher under a grandfathered carbon permits case than under a carbon tax (or under an 
auctioned case). As explained above, the much 
reflect the inability of the command-and-control policy to generate revenues that can be 
used to reduce pre-existing distortionary taxes. 
 Of course, this ‘double dividend’ feature of a carbon tax has important implications 
for ‘green tax swaps’ for distortionary taxes, because different taxes have different 
distortionary effects on the economy. To minimise the impact on the general level of prices, 
revenues raised through an increase in one indirect tax (the carbon tax) could be offset by a 
reduction of another indirect tax, for example value added tax (VAT).12 This has been 
confirmed by several studies (e.g., DRI (1991), Standaert (1992), and Barker et al. (1993)), 
the results of which show that reducing VAT offsets the carbon tax’s inflation impact more 
than using the carbon tax fiscal revenues to decrease other taxes. The studies of 
12 A carbon tax, by raising the prices of fossil fuels, will raise the general level of prices. 
Offsetting it with reductions in VAT or other taxes tends to lower the price level, but the 
price effect is expected to vary, depending on the tax offset arrangements. 
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Karadeloglou (1992) and Standaert (1992) also show that the effects in the case of reducing 
VAT on both GDP and employment are less negative than those in other tax offset cases. 
Another measure used to recycle all revenues from the carbon tax back to the economy is 
by means of reducing income tax. However, in this case inflation is likely to increase, 
although the extent of acceleration depends on the character of wage negotiations for 
increases in disposable income resulting from the reduction in income tax. This higher 
inflationary response has been found in the modelling of the effects of the CEC tax (cf. 
DRI, 1991; Karadeloglou, 1992; Standaert, 1992; Barker et al., 1993). Alternatively, if the 
carbon tax revenues are retained in treasury coffers to reduce public sector deficits, then 
this could depress the economy. If the revenues were all spent by the government, for 
xample on non-fossil energy investment, this would imply a large investment programme 
hich could lead to rapid inflation (Barker et al., 1993). 
e
w
 
 
4. Distributive implications 
 
 The impact of a domestic carbon tax on the distribution of income is a fundamental 
factor determining its acceptability (cf. Baranzini, 1997). Since lower income households 
spend a larger proportion of their income on energy than higher income households do, a 
carbon tax is expected to have a regressive impact on the distribution of income. For 
example, Smith (1992) calculates the distributional effects on different income groups of a 
mixed carbon and energy tax at $10 per barrel in the UK. The results show that the poorest 
20% of the population would have to pay an additional tax of £1.45 per week, the richest 
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20% an additional £2.95 per week, and the average household an additional £2.21 per 
week. Translated into increases of tax paid as a percentage of total spending, these figures 
are equivalent to 2.4%, 0.8% and 1.4%, respectively. Clearly, the relative burden of the 
additional tax would be heavier for the poorest decile and lower for the richest. Similar 
findings are also shown by the study of Poterba (1991), the results of which show that, if 
the US imposed a tax of $100 per ton of carbon, the tax burden would amount to 10% of 
income
hidden from the general public, whereas the introduction of a carbon tax is more directly 
 for the lowest income group, whereas the corresponding figure would amount only 
to 1.5% for the highest income group.  
However, there are a number of studies that show that the distributive impacts are 
relatively weak. A review of the literature on this topic by Speck (1999) shows that, 
although carbon or energy taxes are regressive, the impacts on low-income households 
are relatively moderate, depending on the type of fuel being taxed (heating, transport), 
but also on the distribution of benefits from improved environment quality among the 
population. In the studies where energy products are distinguished between domestic 
energy (e.g., energy used for heating, cooking, lighting, etc.) and transport fuels, it 
appears that the overall weak regressive effect of carbon taxes is due to taxes on domestic 
energy, because the taxation of transport fuels has a weakly progressive outcome for most 
EU countries (Barker and Köhler, 1998). Nevertheless, even if the distributive impacts 
are relatively small, the distributive argument against carbon taxes is intense, probably 
because the costs associated with other instruments (e.g., regulations) can be easily 
perceived with an increase in prices. 13Recent history in developed countries’ fiscal 
                                                          
13 Unfortunately, there are relatively few studies on the distributional impacts in developing 
countries. Shah and Larsen (1992) argue that the results in developed countries cannot be 
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policies suggests that there is great resistance to the introduction of taxes that fall on the 
poor (cf. Poterba, 1991). Thus, if public support for the imposition of carbon taxes is to 
be secured, their possible regressive distributional impacts warrant serious political 
attention in the design of the tax.14 There are different options to mitigate the potential 
regressive impacts of a carbon tax. 
One way to mitigate the regressive distributional impacts is to set a tax-free 
allowance for essential use of energy. For instance, energy – in particular metered 
domestic energy – could be taxed only above a certain floor, so that each household has a 
tax free energy allowance. The idea is that some amount of energy is necessary to satisfy 
basic needs. Above that floor, energy would be progressively taxed to provide the 
incentive for reducing energy consumption. Such a scheme is already implemented in the 
Dutch regulatory energy tax on small energy users. The tax introduced in January 1996 
was designed with special consideration given to distributional concerns. It has set a tax-
free allowance of 800 m3 per year for gas and of 800 kWh for electricity to reduce its 
distributional effect on lower income groups (Alblas, 1997).  
The other ways to decrease the regressive impacts of energy/carbon taxes are 
through the use of the generated fiscal revenues. One possibility is by means of ex post 
lump-sum redistribution of carbon tax revenues to population. Such a scheme would 
                                                                                                                                                                             
affected by institutional factors. Among some important factors that may have a bearing on 
generalized for the developing countries, where the incidence of carbon taxes would be 
tax-shifting are market power, price controls, import quotas, rationed foreign exchange, the 
ability of the British government in 1994 to 
raise VAT on domestic fuel from 8% to 17.5% was at least due partly to concerns about its 
impacts on the poor. 
presence of black markets and tax evasion, and urban-rural migration (see Shah and Larsen 
(1992) for a further discussion). 
14 Ekins (1999) believes for instance that the in
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mitigate regressive distributional impacts, because the lowest income groups will 
proportionally receive a higher amount, relative to their income, than highest income 
households will do. However, using the carbon tax revenues in this way will reduce the 
scope for the revenues to be used to maximise the efficiency gains from reductions in 
other existing distortionary taxes, and could probably lead to negative effects on 
macroeconomic variables, such as inflation and employment. Another possibility to 
compensate poorer households suffering from the tax is by using the generated fiscal 
revenues to reduce labour taxes, decrease income taxation, or change the social security 
system, such as an increase in housing benefits and social benefits based on means-tested 
benefits. Those options can have a better outcome in terms of mitigating distributional 
effects than lump-sum redistribution. However, such measures should be accompanied by 
 comp
ificing the distributional neutrality of the package (Smith, 1992). 
a lementary redistribution policy that targets those social groups that do not benefit 
directly from such tax cuts, such as pensioners and the unemployed.  
 All this highlights the fact that unless low income groups are to be made worse off 
by the carbon tax, a part of the revenues from the tax will need to be used to compensate 
poorer households suffering from the tax, e.g., by lump-sum redistribution, through tax 
reductions, or increases in social security benefits and pensions. Unfortunately, using the 
carbon tax revenues in this way will reduce the scope for the revenues to be used to 
maximise the efficiency gains from reductions in other existing distortionary taxes, for 
example, VAT described above (cf. Barker, 1992; Pearce, 1991). Thus, there is a clear 
trade-off between efficiency and equity in the use of the revenues: the efficiency gains can 
only be achieved by sacr
We should however note that, from an acceptability point of view, it seems that the way 
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energy/carbon taxes fiscal revenues are redistributed does not matter that much, as shown 
in a recent empirical study by Thalmann (2001). The study analyses the results of the vote 
of the Swiss citizens on three different energy tax proposals, which differed mainly on the 
mode of revenue recycling. The three proposals were rejected and Thalmann (2001) shows 
that for most voters the mode of revenue recycling did not matter. Those who distinguished 
the taxes favoured the smaller tax whose revenues were dedicated to subsidies for the 
greatest number of different uses, but individual approval depended foremost on political 
preferences and general confidence in government.   
 
 
5. International competitiveness 
 
A domestic carbon/energy tax has potentially important implications for the 
international competitiveness of economies in relative terms. Although international 
competitiveness is not necessarily reduced over the long term by higher energy prices, in 
certain industries the effects of a unilateral carbon tax may be serious in the short term. 
This issue has become the main stumbling block for the introduction of energy/carbon 
taxes (Barde, 1997), and thus has been a constant concern to policymakers. 
Competitiveness at the firm level is the ability of a firm to maintain or even 
increase international or domestic market shares and profitability. A firm’ competitiveness 
is influenced both by ‘micro’ factors, such as cost structure, product quality, trademark, 
service and logistical networks, and by ‘macro’ factors, such as exchange rates, trade rules 
and political regime stability (Baron and ECON-Energy, 1997). A carbon/energy tax affects 
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a firm’s competitiveness by changing its relative production costs. For example, if a firm 
makes intensive use of energy, ceteris paribus, then imposing a carbon/energy tax will 
increase its production cost relative to those less energy-intensive firms in the short term. 
Thus, it would experience a decline in competitiveness, whereas less energy-intensive firms 
would obtain a relative cost advantage in the short term. The changes in relative 
competitive positions would lead to ‘winners’ as well as ‘losers’ from the imposition of 
carbon/energy tax. Not surprisingly, ‘losers’ lobby strongly against the imposition of 
carbon/energy taxes. They even threaten to relocate their business activities to those 
countries that have relatively lax environmental standards, if such a tax were put in place. 
This raises the question: do environmental taxes and regulations hurt firms’ 
competitiveness so badly that they are forced to move to pollution havens? There is 
growing literature on this topic, and the existing studies on trade implications of 
environmental regulations might give us some indications. 
Grossman and Krueger (1993), for example, have examined whether pollution 
abatement costs influenced the patterns of the U.S. bilateral trade and investment with 
Mexico and found that “the available evidence does not support the hypothesis that cross-
country differences in environmental standards are an important determinant of the global 
patterns of international trade.” Jaffe et al. (1995) review and analyse over 100 studies on 
the potential effects of environmental regulations on the competitiveness of American 
industry, and conclude that “studies attempting to measure the effect of environmental 
regulation on net exports, overall trade flows, and plant-location decisions have produced 
estimates that are either small, statistically insignificant or not robust to tests of model 
specification.”. The Annex I Expert Group on the UNFCCC (Baron and ECON-Energy, 
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1997) undertook a static analysis of the cost increases from a tax of $100 per ton of carbon 
on four energy-intensive industries (iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, paper and pulp, and 
chemical products) in the OECD countries. These sectors represent 3 to 7% of GDP and 1 to 
4% of labour force. As shown in Table 1, the average cost increase measured as percentage 
of total production value differs among countries and sectors, but is generally relatively low 
(below 2%) except for Australia and Canada. This analysis concludes that other factors 
affecting price levels, such as exchange rate variations, may well dwarf the price effects of a 
carbon tax, at least at the rates that are generally proposed in the current climate debates.  
 
Table 1  Selected OECD countries’ cost increasea from a tax of $100 per ton of carbon as 
percentage of production value 
  
 Total 
energy-
intensive 
industries 
Iron and 
steel 
Non-ferrous 
metals 
Chemical 
products 
Pulp and 
paper 
USA 
Canada 
Japan 
Australia 
France 
Germany 
UK 
Italy 
Belgium 
2.8 (2.5) 
4.1 (4.3) 
1.2 (1.0) 
5.2 (5.0) 
1.4 (1.1) 
1.6 (1.4) 
1.6 (1.3) 
1.4 (1.2) 
2.3 (2.1) 
2.3 
6.2 
2.0 
5.8 
2.4 
2.6 
3.6 
2.0 
7.3 
3.1 
3.7 
0.7 
11.4 
1.4 
1.2 
1.9 
1.1 
0.8 
2.8 (2.2) 
4.1 (2.3) 
1.0 (0.6) 
1.7 (1.4) 
1.3 (0.8) 
1.4 (1.1) 
1.2 (0.8) 
1.3 (0.9) 
1.6 (1.2) 
3.2 
5.0 
0.6 
2.6 
0.6 
1.0 
1.2 
0.7 
0.6 
 
a The figures include carbon emissions through electricity generation and from process 
emissions in aluminium production. 
Numbers in parentheses indicate cost increase when the carbon tax is applied only to fossil 
fuels used for energy purposes. 
Source: Baron and ECON-Energy, 1997. 
 
Concerning industrial relocation, there is some evidence that some energy-
intensive national and multinational firms (e.g., oil refining, aluminium, and cement) 
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have chosen to shift investment and production to other countries, especially to 
developing countries. OECD (1993) indicates that the firms more likely to reinvest 
abroad or shut down capacity are those in sectors suffering competitive difficulties due to 
overall economic conditions and where environmental costs are a high share of new 
investment costs.15 Trade liberalisation among countries with different environmental 
policies could also increase relocation (see Hudson (1993) in the context of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement). However, uncertainties over future environmental 
standards may impede foreign investment and decrease predisposition to relocate (see 
Zamparutti and Klavens (1993) for Eastern European countries). 
However, the above findings are not necessarily going to be the case of 
energy/carbon taxes in the future. Indeed, environmental regulations and taxes applied to 
date have been relatively modest, and they fall short of the levels required to achieve the 
UNFCCC’s ultimate objective of stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system. For example, if carbon taxes were used as the sole means of meeting the 
Kyoto emissions obligations, the level of the taxes would be very high and could thus 
have significant implications for competitiveness. However, since all industrial countries 
will have to reduce emissions under the Kyoto Protocol, industries in different countries 
will almost simultaneously experience an increase in their costs. In this case, a country 
implementing a carbon tax and depending on the recycling of fiscal revenues could 
increase the competitiveness of its industries, compared to other countries implementing 
less cost-effective instruments, like e.g., regulations. 
                                                          
15 Data on plant closures because of tight environmental regulations are difficult to find 
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Table 2  Effective and nominal tax rates (1998) in selected sectors in Sweden, Denmark 
and Norway (ECU per ton of CO2 emissions, 1 ECU = US$ 1.12) 
 
Sweden 
(nominal) 
Denmark 
(nominal) 
Norway 
(nominal) 
 
Energy 
products Manufacturing 
industry 
Light 
processes 
Heavy 
processes 
Pulp/paper industry
Gas oil 
(heating) 
20.9 
(41.9) 
11.2 
(12.5) 
3.1 
(12.5) 
9.9 
(19.9) 
Heavy fuel oil 18.8 
(37.7) 
11.6 
(12.8) 
3.2 
(12.8) 
8.8 
(17.6) 
LPG 20.2 
(40.4) 
11.5 
(12.8) 
3.2 
(12.8) 
0 
(0) 
Coal 21.5 
(43) 
11.9 
(13.2) 
3.3 
(13.2) 
23.4 
(23.4) 
Natural gas 19.3 
(38.5) 
11.3 
(12.5) 
3.1 
(12.5) 
0 
(48.8) 
 
Source: Adapted from EC (1999). 
 
The potentially high energy/carbon taxes underline the importance to mitigate 
their competitiveness effects in designing the taxes. One commonly used way is to grant 
energy-intensive industries a lower tax rate than, e.g. households, or even to exempt these 
industries from coverage of the taxes. For example, the unimplemented CEC proposal 
provided for exemptions for the six energy-intensive industries, such as iron and steel, non-
ferrous metals, chemicals, cement, glass, and pulp and paper. In countries such as 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden, where carbon/energy taxes are already implemented, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(see Sprenger (1998) for Germany). 
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energy-intensive industries are generally exempted from the taxes, either totally or 
partially (which leads to a large gap between effective and nominal tax rates as shown in 
Table 2).  If not totally exempted, the revenues from environmental taxes are often fully 
recycled back to the affected industries, for example in the form of grants for energy 
saving investments and cuts in employers’ social security contributions (cf. Baranzini et 
al., 2000). 
However, since a carbon tax is intended to fall most heavily on the products of 
carbon-intensive industries, the exclusion of these industries from coverage of the carbon 
tax on the grounds of competitiveness reduces the effectiveness of the carbon tax in achiev-
ing its objective of reducing CO2 emissions.16 As demonstrated in the study of Bruvoll and 
Larsen (2003), although the carbon tax implemented in Norway reached as high as US$ 51 
per ton of CO2 in 1999, exempting those sectors where the carbon tax would have been 
otherwise effective only led to the modest reduction in emissions of 2.3% in comparison 
with no carbon tax case. Moreover, such exemptions require a higher tax rate for the non-
exempt industries and thus increase the costs of achieving a given level of emissions 
reduction. For instance, Böhringer and Rutherford (1997) found that losses associated 
with exemptions can be substantial, even when the share of exempted sectors in overall 
                                                          
16 In addition to this, exemptions lead to two more problems. The first is that the industries, 
which are exempt from paying the carbon tax, will improve their competitive position in 
relation to those industries which are not. There will therefore be some switching of 
demand towards the products of these energy-intensive industries, which is precisely the 
reaction that a carbon tax should avoid. The other problem is that firms which find 
themselves paying the carbon tax will try to be reclassified as exempt or eligible for rebates 
if at all possible, thus limiting the impact of the tax on energy consumption and CO2 
emissions (cf. Barker et al., 1993). 
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economic activity and carbon emissions is small. Alternative recycling options, like wage 
subsidies to export- and energy-intensive sectors, can give better results in terms of 
employment and are less costly than tax exemptions. However, removing exemptions 
could be relatively costly for those sectors that benefit from them. For instance, Godal 
and Holtsmark (1998) estimate that removing exemptions in the Norwegian CO2 tax 
regime and replacing them by a uniform CO2 tax on all CO2 emissions would decrease 
profits in the emission-intensive industry by 18%. 
 Another means of mitigating competitiveness effects is through border tax 
adjustments (BTAs), whereby exporting countries rebate taxes levied on the products 
when exported, while the importing countries impose the taxes on imported products that 
have not been subjected to a similar level of taxes levied on their domestic products. The 
adjustments enable a country to tax its domestic energy-consuming industries for internal 
purposes while preserving its competitiveness internationally by allowing its exports to 
compete in untaxed markets abroad and domestically by taxing imports up to the same 
level. This kind of BTAs reflects the application of the destination principle to products: 
products should be taxed in the country where they are consumed and not in the country 
where they are produced, unless they are also consumed there. Clearly, such adjustments 
are intended to ensure that internal taxes on products are trade-neutral. BTAs have been 
used in the US in two important instances of environmental excise taxes: the Superfund 
Chemical Exercises (Superfund Tax) and the Ozone-Depleting Chemicals (ODC) Tax. 
With a modest rate of $ 4.87 per ton, the Superfund Tax was designed to place the burden 
of such cleanup on those responsible for generating the wastes, but was not intended to 
influence behaviour through the price system. On the other hand, the ODC Tax aimed to 
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harness market forces in finding substitutes for the taxed chemicals, which turned out to 
be effective both in raising the price of taxed chemicals and in discouraging their 
production (Hoerner, 1998). 
  When considering BTAs for energy/carbon taxes, it is necessary to distinguish 
energy products (e.g., coal, oil, and gas) from final products (e.g., cars, chemical 
products). As it would be expected, the application of BTAs to energy products is 
relatively straightforward. The GATT/WTO rules allow the same taxes to be imposed on 
imported-like (energy) products and the rebate of indirect taxes on exported domestic 
products, as long as there is no discrimination against foreign energy products. However, 
the situation becomes much more complicated when the products to be imported or 
exported are not the energy products themselves, but goods whose production or 
distribution involve the use of taxed energy inputs. Let alone whether the process-based 
BTAs are in conflict with the GATT/WTO principles (see, for example, Stewardson 
(1994); Brack et al. (1999)), there are formidable technical difficulties, if not entirely 
impossibilitiesle, in identifying the appropriate energy/carbon contents embodied in 
virtually all traded products, unless exporting countries that do not impose energy/carbon 
taxes are willing to cooperate in certifying how the products are produced.17 In the absence 
                                                          
17 The use of a de minimis floor could substantially reduce the number of products that 
would be covered in the case of energy/carbon taxes, so that BTAs should be avoided 
where the tax is trivial percentage of the price. For example, in the case of the above 
Superfund Tax, BTAs are limited to primary products for which the share of taxable 
chemicals in production is at least 50%, while in the case of the ODC Tax a de minimis rule 
is applied to non-listed products (Hoerner, 1998). However, the desirability of the use of a 
de minimis floor to lower substantial administrative burden must be weighted against the 
environmental effectiveness of energy/carbon taxes.  
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of any information regarding the carbon content of the products from exporting countries, 
importing countries could for instance prescribe the tax rates based on their domestically 
predominant method of production for the imported products. This practice is by no means 
without foundation. For example, the US Secretary of the Treasury has adopted the 
approach in the tax on imported toxic chemicals under the Superfund Tax (Poterba and 
Rotemberg, 1995; Hoerner, 1998). Such a practice seems very hard to justify in the case of 
energy/carbon taxes, given the wide range of technologies in use around the world and very 
different energy resource endowments and consumption patterns among countries. Even if 
the same technology were used to produce the same products among countries, the 
differing resource endowments could lead to a sharp difference in the energy consumption 
of their most economically efficient technology. For a country that relies on coal as its 
major source of energy, the larger amount of energy used by a coal-based technology per 
unit of output vis-à-vis oil/gas-based technologies occurs partly as a result of its high 
proportion of coal consumption, because coal-based technologies are less efficient than 
oil/gas-based technologies (Zhang, 1997). It seems unfair to penalise the country whose 
energy consumption is coal-dominant, just because it is unfortunate to have less 
endowments of oil/gas that, if burned, emits less carbon that coal. Moreover, such a 
practice would violate the WTO rules that do not allow to take trade measures on the basis 
of the differences in process and production methods (PPM), and appear to deprive 
developing countries of enjoying the very basis of comparative advantage in their 
production. Furthermore, such tariffs would likely violate commitments made by the WTO 
contracting countries not to raise import taxes above ‘bound tariff’ levels, i.e., maximum 
tariffs for goods listed in an annex to the GATT (WTO, 1995). 
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 The potential effects on competitiveness can also be attenuated if the introduction 
of energy/carbon taxes is announced in advance, phased-in gradually and increased over 
time. This will help to reduce economic effects of the tax by avoiding unduly early 
retirements of existing infrastructures and, at the same time, send a steady but strong 
price signal for a shift away from carbon-intensive choices. For example, the above ODC 
Tax in the US was phased-in gradually over a period of years. For the most important 
ODCs, the Tax is currently more than five times the ex-tax price (Hoerner, 1998). 
 Of course, another means of mitigating competitiveness effects would be through 
the international harmonisation of energy/carbon taxes. Up to now, our discussion has 
been restricted to a domestic carbon tax, which is an efficient way to achieve a domestic 
emission target. However, even if domestic emission reduction targets are achieved in cost-
efficient ways, a global cost-efficient emission reduction target can only be achieved if CO2 
emissions are distributed among countries in such a way that the marginal cost of 
abatement is equalised among countries (cf. Hoel, 1991, 1992). Global cost efficiency may 
be achieved through either an international carbon tax or a tradeable carbon emission 
permits regime. Hoel (1991) has shown that a tax administrated and collected by an 
international agency would be too bureaucratic and would interfere with domestic 
sovereignty, while a tax implemented by each government would fall foul of free rider 
problems, since governments could easily offset a carbon tax by reducing other domestic 
taxes on fossil fuels. The way out could be one in which the carbon tax is globally imposed 
on each country by some international agency, but nationally administrated and collected 
through its central government (cf. Hoel, 1991). The carbon tax would be set to be the same 
for each country. The revenues from the tax would then be reimbursed and handed back to 
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the countries where the revenues are raised according to some agreed rule of allocation. 
Each country would then act to minimise the sum of its tax payments and abatement costs. 
Moreover, if an international carbon tax could be put in place, it will help avoid applying 
complex border tax adjustments among the countries where the common tax is imposed. 
 However, the international harmonisation of energy/carbon taxes is faced with 
some fundamental problems. For instance, the above mentioned CEC proposal for 
harmonisation at the EU level failed to gain the unanimous support of its member states, 
mainly because some member states (e.g., the UK) opposed an increase in the fiscal 
competence of the European Community and thus opposed the introduction at a EU level 
of a new tax on the grounds of fiscal sovereignty (Delbeke, 1997; Bill, 1999). Even if it 
had been agreed at the EU level, competitiveness concerns from the outside of the EU 
suggest that at least similar actions in other main OECD competitors, especially in the 
United States and Japan, should be undertaken (or some more general OECD-wide tax 
should be adopted), although it is ideal to impose carbon taxes globally in order to achieve 
sufficient reductions in global CO2 emissions. However, given the political difficulties of 
introducing carbon taxes in countries such as the US, the prospects for the harmonisation 
of carbon taxes at the OECD level seem remote, let alone across wider group of 
countries. Moreover, the initial difference in energy prices further complicates the 
harmonisation of carbon tax (Zhang, 1997; Eizenstat, 1998). As a consequence of existing 
distortions in price regulations, taxation, national monopolies, barriers to trade and so on, 
there are initially great differences in energy prices, both between fuels and across 
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countries (cf. Hoeller and Coppel, 1992).18 If CO2 emissions are then to be reduced by 
similar amounts in two countries, ceteris paribus, lower taxes are required for the country 
with low prices before the tax imposition than for the country with the higher pre-tax 
prices. Thus, an eventual cost-efficient regime of international carbon tax would 
presumably need to remove existing distortions in international energy markets. Otherwise, 
countries with lower pre-tax prices would enjoy free rider benefits, whereas countries with 
higher pre-tax prices would attempt to offset the impact of international carbon tax through 
other changes in tax and subsidy policies. In the latter case, distinguishing permissible from 
prohibited policies would be extraordinarily difficult and could bring unacceptable 
international scrutiny to domestic tax decisions (Eizenstat, 1998). 
  Thus, it follows that while the harmonisation of energy/carbon taxes at the OECD 
and global levels seems to be theoretically the ideal solution, it is hardly a practical 
solution to mitigating competitiveness effects. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change is the first international environmental agreement that sets legally binding 
emissions targets for a basket of six greenhouse gases and timetables for Annex B 
countries. To fulfil their emissions reduction commitments, Annex B countries will need 
                                                          
18 For instance, based on computations made by Hoeller and Coppel (1992), the average 
implicit carbon tax in 1988 in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)/ton of carbon is US$ 302 in 
Switzerland, and only US$ 192 in the US.  
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to implement domestic policies. Domestic emissions trading and carbon/energy taxes are 
part of the main domestic economic instruments for complying with the emissions 
targets. Emissions trading, unlike carbon taxes, is a form of rationing and its great 
advantage is that in this way one can be sure of achieving the emissions targets. 
However, the costs of delivering such a guarantee are uncertain. By contrast, the actual 
achievements in emissions reductions resulting from a carbon tax remain uncertain, 
because of the imperfect knowledge of price elasticities of demand and supply for fossil 
fuels, especially for the large price increases caused by carbon taxes for major emissions 
cutbacks. Nevertheless, a carbon tax provides a greater certainty about the likely costs of 
complying with the emissions targets, and acts as safety valve in case marginal abatement 
costs are much higher than expected (see Jacoby and Ellerman (2003) for detailed 
discussion on the safety valve and climate policy). Whether carbon taxes are a superior or 
an inferior alternative to emissions trading depends, among other elements, on the degree 
of uncertainty about marginal damage curves and their correlation with marginal 
abatement cost curves. Since Weitzman’s (1974) contribution, as long as the threshold for 
severe climate damages remains unknown, this debate on price or quantity controls is 
expected to continue. In this context, a “hybrid” mechanism combining a carbon tax with 
an emissions trading system has been proposed (e.g., see Pizer, 1997, 1999). However, 
without further comparison with emissions trading and other climate policy measures 
(see Jacoby and Ellerman (2003) for discussion on a price or quantity instrument), this 
paper has focused exclusively on carbon taxes. This is not to say, however, that carbon 
taxes are recommended as the sole climate policy measure. Rather, the intention is just to 
highlight some crucial aspects in designing a domestic carbon tax. 
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Several European countries have already implemented energy/carbon taxes to 
reduce carbon emissions. As an economic instrument, it is widely believed that the 
introduction of energy/carbon taxes helps to lower the global costs to achieve the 
required emissions targets in comparison with conventional command-and-control 
regulations. But it will not avoid all the possible impacts on the international distribution 
of wealth, on households and on different sectors, especially on carbon-intensive 
industries and energy consumers. For this reason, in this paper we focus on the evaluation 
of carbon/energy taxes with respect to their impacts on competitiveness and the 
distribution of income. 
Probably, the main obstacle to implementing carbon taxes is the potential impact 
on competitiveness. Yet, empirical studies on existing carbon/energy taxes seem to 
indicate that competitive losses are not significant. However, the history of carbon/energy 
taxes implementation is relatively recent, their introduction has been gradual, and some 
peculiarities (e.g., exemptions, ceilings, recycling schemes) are not easy to account for in 
empirical models. In addition, carbon/energy taxes are often introduced within a more 
general policy package aimed at reducing emissions and thus their precise impacts are 
difficult to disentangle from those resulting from environmental policy in general. 
Nevertheless, commitments to future emissions reductions may imply higher 
carbon/energy tax rates, with more potential effects on competitiveness than in the past. 
Even in that case, however, it has been shown that revenue recycling can be a useful way 
to offset these side effects. On the contrary, rebates and exemptions on trade- and energy-
intensive industries are less cost-effective and decrease abatement incentives in those 
sectors that emit the most.  
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Concerning the distributive impacts of carbon/energy taxes, the results from 
empirical studies show that carbon taxes are generally considered to be regressive, but 
that the overall impact is relatively weak. It should be noted that existing studies only 
focus on the distribution of costs and they do not incorporate the distribution of benefits 
from improved environment quality, mainly because they are highly uncertain and 
difficult to measure, especially in monetary terms. In addition, in many cases, a carefully 
designed carbon tax, in combination with revenue recycling measures, could address 
possible regressive impacts, especially if the introduction of carbon taxes is phased in 
gradually and over a long time period. Therefore, the fiscal revenues generated by the 
carbon tax are a central element in mitigating its main impacts. However, we have shown 
that the ways carbon taxes revenues can be used to compensate for the regressive 
impacts, e.g., lump-sum redistribution or increases in social security benefits, are often 
not the best options to maximise the efficiency gains from the tax, which may be 
accomplished with reductions in distortionary taxes, e.g., capital taxes. Thus, there is 
often a trade-off between efficiency and equity in the use of the carbon tax revenues. 
Past experience shows that governments have frequently not opted for just one 
policy instrument to address a specific environmental issue, but implemented a package 
of instruments instead. Although the paper focuses exclusively on carbon taxes, in actual 
practice, governments are expected to implement domestic policies and make use of e of 
the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms in order to meet their emissions commitments. For 
example, an Annex B government could allow emissions sources subject to domestic 
carbon taxes to purchase permits on the international market to reduce their tax liability. 
In this case, the tax rate relative to the international price of permits is crucial. If the tax 
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rate is below the permit price, then the amount of tax revenues could be substantial, 
because paying the tax is less costly than purchasing permits. If the tax rate is above the 
permit price, allowing the use of permits in lieu of tax payments improves efficiency, but 
may put the governments at risk of budgeting. When the government would rely on the 
carbon tax as a source of revenues, it might be unwilling to risk a substantial reduction in 
its revenues. Consequently, it might limit the extent to which the permits could be used in 
order to protect its revenues. A carbon tax on emissions in excess to the allowed 
emissions levels could also be incorporated as a compliance mechanism into the 
compliance provisions of the Kyoto Protocol. By setting the tax rate much higher than the 
permit price, this tax is in fact operating like an excess emissions tax (or a penalty for 
uncovered emissions) and it will act as an effective deterrent for non-compliance. 
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